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Faculty and Deans

THE GHOSTS OF HOMER PLESSY
Rodney A. Smollat
INTRODUCTION

It is 1996 and Plessy v. Ferguson 1 is one-hundred years old
and forty-two years dead. Plessy is forty-two years dead because
in 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education2 the Supreme Court
overruled it. But I believe in ghosts, and Homer Adolph Plessy
left many behind.
On June 7, 1892, Plessy attempted to board a train traveling
between New Orleans and Covington, Louisiana, a small town
thirty miles north of New Orleans near the Louisiana-Mississippi
state line. He took a vacant seat in a coach designated as for
whites only. Plessy was one-eighth African blood and seveneighths Caucasian and, according to the allegations in the
lawsuit he filed, a "mixture of colored blood was not discernible
in him."3 He was ordered by a train conductor to vacate the
coach and to take a seat in the coach "assigned to persons of the
colored race,"4 but he refused. He was forcibly ejected with the
aid of a police officer and thrown in the parish jail.5 Plessy had
violated an 1890 Louisiana law providing for separate railway
carriages for whites and blacks. 6

t Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law and Director, Institute of Bill of Rights
Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of Willian~ and Mary.
1. 163 u.s. 537 (1896).
2. 347 u.s. 483 (1954).
3. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 541.
4. Id. at 542.
5. Id.
6. See id. at 540-41 (citing 1890 La. Acts 111, p. 152). The Supreme Court
summarized the pertinent provisions of the legislation:
The first section of the statute enacts "that all railway companies
carrying passengers in their coaches in this State, shall provide equal but
separate accommodations for the white, and colored races, by providing
two or more passenger coaches for each passenger train, or by dividing
the passenger coaches by a partition so as to secure separate
accommodations: Provided, That this section shall not be construed to
apply to street railroads. No person or persons, shall be admitted to
occupy seats in coaches, other than, the ones, assigned, to them on
account of the race they belong to."
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The passage of the 1890 Louisiana legislation was in some
respects historically surprising, for it was passed against the
backdrop of the peculiarly cosmopolitan and multi-ethnic New
Orleans society. As Richard Kluger explains, New Orleans was a
racial bouillabaisse of French, African, Anglo-Saxon, and Indian
stock unlike any other community in the nation, where "many no
longer bothered to fret about how racially pure or polluted their
blood was."7 During Reconstruction in 1869, Louisiana had
actually passed a law prohibiting segregation by public
carriers-precisely the reverse of the 1890 law Homer Plessy was
charged with breaking. 8
A challenge to the 1869 law reached the Supreme Court in
Hall v. DeCuir.9 Josephine DeCuir, a woman of color, boarded
the steamboat "Governor Allen" for a trip from New Orleans to
Hermitage, a landing within Louisiana. The boat master refused
to let her ride in a whites-only cabin, and she sued him under
the Louisiana anti-segregation law. The Supreme Court held the
law unconstitutional. While the Louisiana statute at issue
purported to outlaw discrimination by common carriers only with
regard to traffic within Louisiana, the Supreme Court struck the

By the second section it was enacted "that the officers of such
passenger trains shall have power and are hereby required to assign
each passenger to the coach or compartment used for the race to which
such passenger belongs; any passenger insisting on going into a coach or
compartment to which by race he does not belong, shall be liable to a
fine of twenty-five dollars, or in lieu thereof to imprisonment for a period
of not more than twenty days in the parish prison, and any officer of
any railroad insisting on assigning a passenger to a coach or
compartment other than the one set aside for the race to which said
passenger belongs, shall be liable to a fine of twenty-five dollars, or in
lieu thereof to imprisonment for a period of not more than twenty days
in the parish prison; and should any passenger refuse to occupy the
coach or compartment to which he or she is assigned by the officer of
such railway, said officer shall have power to refuse to carry such
passenger on his train, and for such refusal neither he nor the railway
company which he represents shall be liable for damages in any of the
courts of this State."
The third section provides penalties for the refusal or neglect of the
officers, directors, conductors and employes of railway companies to
comply with the act, with a proviso that "nothing in this act shall be
construed as applying to nurses attending children of the other race."
I d.
7. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 72 (1975).

8. Id. at 72-73.
9. 95
485 (1877).

u.s.
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law down as a violation of the Commerce Clause. Noting that the
Mississippi River and its tributaries traverse many states, the
Court concluded that the effect of the statute would be to force
white passengers in a whites-only cabin who were on a vessel
coming from a state that permitted or required segregation to
"share the accommodations of that cabin with such colored
persons as may come on board afterwards, if the law is
enforced."10 This the Court found quite reprehensible, for it
interfered with the dormant prerogative of Congress to legislate
on such issues under the Commerce Clause.
The Supreme Court would subsequently find, however, in
Louisville, New Orleans and Texas Railway Company v.
Mississippi, 11 that the mirror opposite of the law in Hall-a law,
like that in Plessy, that required segregation on traffic moving
intrastate-did not violate the Commerce Clause. So at least as
far as the Commerce Clause was concerned, it was not a burden
on interstate commerce to require a black person sitting next to a
white person to get up and move as the carrier moved into a
segregated state, but it was an unreasonable burden to require a
white person to allow a black person into the cabin as the carrier
moved into a non-segregation state. Go figure.
So Homer Plessy was caught in the "one-drop" rule, the
principle that one drop of African-American blood renders a
person black. The rule embraces a metaphor of purity and
contamination: White is unblemished and pure, so one drop of
ancestral black blood renders one black. 12 Plessy challenged the
1890 Louisiana law as violating the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments. In a decision by Justice Henry Billings Brown, 13
the Supreme Court rejected Plessy's constitutional challenges,

10. Id. at 489.
11. 133 u.s. 587 (1890).
12. Neal Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV.
1, 6 (1991). Langston Hughes remarked on the power of that "one drop of Negro
blood":
"One drop-you are a Negro! Now, why is that? Why is Negro blood
so much more powerful than any other kind of blood in the world? If a
man has Irish blood in him, people will say, 'He's part Irish.' If he has a
little Jewish blood, they'll say, 'He's half Jewish.' But if he has just a
small bit of colored blood in him, BAM!-'He's a Negro!' Not, 'He's part
Negro.' ... That drop is really powerful."
LANGSTON HUGHES, SIMPLE TAKES A WIFE 201 (1953).
13. For a portrait of Justice Brown, see Robert Glennon, Jr., Justice Henry Billings
Brown: Values in Tension, 44 COLO. L. REV. 553 (1973).
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approving the doctrine of "separate-but-equal," and with it the
caricature of eqmility known as Jim Crow. 14 It is one-hundred
years since Plessy and forty-two years since Brown. Just think
how far we have come. Think hard.
I.

THE PLESSY OPINION

The majority's opinion was utterly insouciant in its treatment
of Plessy's Thirteenth Amendment claim, dismissing it in three
cryptic paragraphs. The Court claimed that the lack of conflict
with the Thirteenth Amendment was "too clear for
argument"15-a fortunate thing for the Court, for it failed to
provide one. Relying on the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 the Court
held that the Thirteenth Amendment was "intended primarily to
abolish slavery, as it had been previously known in this country,
and that it equally forbade Mexican peonage or the Chinese
coolie trade, when they amounted to slavery or involuntary
servitude."17 Taking its first pass at a theme that would
permeate its opinion, the Court began to sketch a distinction
between genuine legal harm-the stuff of slavery, for
example-and the mere acts of social discrimination of the sort
that Homer Plessy impudently dared to complain. It is the first of
the Plessy Court's many invocations of the "whiny blacks" theme.
The Court repeated the admonition of Justice Bradley in the
Civil Rights Cases 18 that "[i]t would be running the slavery
argument into the ground to make it apply to every act of
discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to the
guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take into his

14. In the words of Juan Williams:

There were Jim Crow schools, Jim Crow restaurants, Jim Crow water
fountains, and Jim Crow customs-blacks were expected to tip their hats
when they walked past whites, but whites did not have to remove their
hats even when they entered a black family's home. Whites were to be
called "sir" and "ma'am" by blacks, who in turn were called by their first
names by whites. People with white skin were to be given a wide berth
on the sidewalk; blacks were expected to step aside meekly.
JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRizE: AMERICA'S CML RIGHTS YEARS, 1954-1965, at 10
(1987).
15. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542 (1896).
16. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
17. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542.
18. 109 u.s. 3 (1883).
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coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or theater, or deal
with in other matters of intercourse or business."19
What blacks like Homer Plessy just do not understand, the
Court was saying, is that white is white and black is black, and
laws that say the twain shall not meet do not subject either race
to servitude or destroy their legal equality: "A statute which
implies merely a legal distinction between the white and colored
races-a distinction which is founded in the color of the two races,
and which must always exist so long as white men are
distinguished from the other race by color-has no tendency to
destroy the legal equality of the two races, or reestablish a state
of involuntary servitude."20
Yet in its paternalistic beneficence, the Court acknowledged
that the Thirteenth Amendment "was regarded by the statesmen
of that day''21 as not going far enough. It would not suffice to
merely abolish slavery and be done with the issue. Instead, the
Fourteenth Amendment was passed "to protect the colored race
from certain laws which had been enacted in the Southern
States, imposing upon the colored race onerous disabilities and
burdens, and curtailing their rights in the pursuit of life, liberty
and property to such an extent that their freedom was of little
value."22 Indeed, the Court pointed again to the Slaughter-House
Cases, this time in a vein that might have held out more promise
for Homer Plessy, observing that "the main purpose" of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to protect African-Americans from
"hostile legislation."23 But hard on this promising opening came
the slamming of the front door on Plessy's face. It is perhaps the
most famous passage from the majority opinion:
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce
the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in
the nature of things it could not have been intended to
abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as
distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the
two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws
permitting, and even requiring, their separation in places
where they are liable to be brought into contact do not

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Plessy, 163 U.S. at 543 (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 542.
Id.
Id.
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necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the
other ....24
Warming to his theme, Justice Brown announced a distinction
between interference with political equality, which the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited, and interference with social
equality, which it did not. Some sort of distinction along these
lines was necessary to achieve his result, for without it there
would have been no way to distinguish the Court's prior decision
in Strauder v. West Virginia 25 and some of its embarrassing
language. Strauder struck down a state statute excluding
African-Americans from juries, holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment secured to them "all the civil rights that the superior
race [may] enjoy."26 Strauder also seemed to endorse the notion
that laws that stigmatize African-Americans violate the
Fourteenth Amendment, decrying legislation "implying inferiority
in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the
rights which others enjoy," and "which are steps towards
reducing them to the condition of a subject race.'127 To get past
Strauder, Justice Brown had to explain first why the law at issue
in Plessy did not constitute any infringement of the "civil rights"
that the "superior race may enjoy," and second, why the law was
not an action "implying inferiority in civil society'' or impairing
the "enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy.''
Justice Brown's opinion initially attacked these problems in a
series of oblique passes. Significant ink was spilled discussing
the Civil Rights Cases, 28 testing the constitutionality of the Civil
Rights Act of 1875.29 The Civil Rights Act of 1875 prohibited
race discrimination in access to inns, public conveyances, and
places of amusement.30
The Supreme Court declared the Civil Rights Act
unconstitutional. The Act was not supported by the Thirteenth
Amendment,31 the Court reasoned, because that Amendment

24. Id. at 544.
25. 100 u.s. 303 (1879).
26. Id. at 306.
27. Id. at 308.
28. 109 u.s. 3 (1883).
29. See id. (citing 18 Stat. 335 (1875)).
30. The Civil Rights Cases were a consolidation of five cases, all of which involved
prosecutions against private citizens who had denied African-Americans
accommodations in theaters or hotels.
31. The Thirteenth Amendment reads:
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was intended to abolish slavery and "all badges and incidents of
slavery."32
The Civil Rights Act, however, did not concern itself with the
badges and incidents of slavery because equality in access to
things such as inns and theaters could not be equated with
slavery or its badges. ''Mere discriminations on account of race or
color," the Court argued, "were not regarded as badges of
slavery."33
The central holding of the Civil Rights Cases remains a
cornerstone of American constitutional law: the so-called "state
action doctrine." In defending the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the
government claimed that Congress had authority to pass the
legislation pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.34 The Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court reasoned, could not be invoked to support legislation
barring discrimination by private actors, as opposed to
governmental entities. The Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
asserted, was aimed only at guaranteeing the "equal protection of
the laws" in matters concerning the laws and actions of the state
itself, not private individuals or businesses:
It is State action of a particular character that is
prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the
subject-matter of the amendment. It has a deeper and
broader scope. It nullifies and makes void all State
legislation, and State action of every kind, which impairs the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, or
which injures them in life, liberty or property without due

Section 1. Neither slavecy nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
32. Ciuil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20.
33. Id. at 25. This aspect of the Ciuil Rights Cases has now been rendered
obsolete; the Supreme Court in modern times is far more expansive in its
understanding of the "badges and incidents" of slavecy, particularly when Congress
invokes its power under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment to enforce the Amendment
through "appropriate legislation." See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968).
34. The Fourteenth Amendment reads: "[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV.
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process of law, or which denies to any of them the equal
protection of the laws. It not only does this, but ... the last
section of the amendment invests Congress with power to
enforce it by appropriate legislation.... To adopt appropriate
legislation for correcting the effects of such prohibited State
laws and State acts, and thus to render them effectually null,
void, and innocuous. This is the legislative power conferred
upon Congress, and this is the whole of it.35

In making these arguments, the Court in the Civil Rights
Cases presaged Plessy and its distinction between civic equality
and social equality. The purpose of the Thirteenth Amendment,
the Court argued in the Civil Rights Cases, was to guarantee
"those fundamental rights which appertain to the essence of
citizenship,"36 not to ensure equality in "social rights."37
The Plessy Court's emphasis on the Civil Rights Cases,
however, was primarily an exercise in atmospherics, for as a
legal matter the Civil Rights Cases could not support the ruling
in Plessy, in which a state law mandated segregation, creating
discrimination that was plainly the product of state action.
illtimately, to turn that trick, the Plessy Court had to meet headon the language in Strauder holding that laws stamping one race
as inferior violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The solution was
to insist that the segregation law quite simply did not imply the
inferiority of African-Americans. If African-Americans thought it
did, it was their problem, a problem of their own sorry
construction and making:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's
argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced
separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a
badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of
anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race

35. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11. The Court in the Civil Rights Cases thus
dealt a twin blow to the protection of the civil rights of African-Americans. It frrst
took a narrow view of the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment, disabling that
Amendment as an effective tool for combating discrimination. It second restricted the
reach of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause-a clause that was
phrased in terms far broader than the Thirteenth Amendment's abolition of
involuntary servitude-by limiting the Fourteenth Amendment to wrongs committed
directly by the government. "The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by . . .
[state] authority, is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that individual," the Court
explained, and not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 17.
36. Id. at 22.
37. Id.
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chooses to put that construction upon it. The argument
necessarily assumes that if, as has been more than once the
case, and is not unlikely to be so again, the colored race
should become the dominant power in the state legislature,
and should enact a law in precisely similar terms, it would
thereby relegate the white race to an inferior position. We
imagine that the white race, at least, would not acquiesce in
this assumption. The argument also assumes that social
prejudices may be overcome by legislation, and that equal
rights cannot be secured to the negro except by an enforced
commingling of the two races. We cannot accept this
proposition. If the two races are to meet upon terms of social
equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual
appreciation of each other's merits and a voluntary consent of
individuals. . . . Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial
instincts or to abolish distinctions based upon physical
differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in
accentuating the difficulties of the present situation. If the
civil and political rights of both races be equal one cannot be
inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one race be
inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United
States cannot put them upon the same plane.38

There are two components to this passage. The first, and most
brazenly false, is that the law did not stamp blacks with a badge
of inferiority. Of course it did, and as Justice Harlan so
eloquently argued in defense, no candid person then or now could
maintain otherwise.39 That the law implied inferiority was all
but admitted in a strange digression in the Court's opinion itself,
in which the Court speculated about whether the law injured the
reputation of persons improperly classified as members of the
wrong race. A white called a black, the Court reasoned, might
well have a cause of action for the damage to his "property'' in
the good reputation of the dominant race. 40

38. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896).
39. See infra notes 41-56 and accompanying text.
40. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 549 ("It is claimed by the plaintiff in error that, in any
mixed community, the reputation of belonging to the dominant race, in this instance
the white race, is property, in the same sense that a right of action, or of
inheritance, is property. Conceding this to be so, for the purposes of this case, we are
unable to see how this statute deprives him of, or in any way affects his right to,
such property. If he be a white man and assigned to a colored coach, he may have
his action for damages against the company for being deprived of his so called
property. Upon the other hand, if he be a colored man and be so assigned, he has
been deprived of no property, since he is not lawfully entitled to the reputation of
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The second claim of this infamous passage is that legislation is
powerless to influence racial attitudes, and that if the races are
not willing to meet on an equal plane, the law cannot place them
there. This claim by the majority is the most terrifying of all
Homer Plessy's ghosts. For one-hundred years later, we continue
to confront the Court's disturbing claim. The ghost is awful to
contemplate: Was the Court right?
A century after Plessy and four decades after Brown, racial
tension and polarization in America remain high. Is Justice
Brown having the last laugh? To face this ghost properly we
must first look to the Plessy majority's nemesis, Justice John
Marshall Harlan, and his celebrated dissent.
II.

HARLAN'S DISSENT

Justice Harlan began his analysis by discussing the legal
status of railroads. Justice Harlan believed deeply in the sanctity
of property,41 but for him railroads were not like any other
private enterprise. They were instead "public highways," clothed
with the power of eminent domain, intended for public use and
benefit, operated "in trust for the public."42 Although we cannot
know precisely what Justice Harlan had in mind with this
opening line of argument, he might have seen it as serving
several purposes. It was, on a most basic level, an oblique attack
on the holding of the Civil Rights Cases and its narrow view of
the state action doctrine. If railroads were public trustees, then
when they discriminated they arguably discriminated under color
of law, and therefore would violate the Fourteenth Amendment
even in the absence of any explicit legislation requiring that
discrimination. Imbuing the railroads with the status of public
trustees also set the stage for the parade of implications Harlan
would later make, in which he presciently asked where the
"separate but equal" principle might stop-if people could be
separated on railroads, then why not streets, sidewalks, open
streetcars, courtrooms, and legislative halls? 43 More than that,

being a white man.").
41. See Kluger, supra note 7, at 81.
42. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 554 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 557-58 ("It is one thing for railroad carriers to furnish, or to be required
by law to furnish, equal accommodations for all whom they are under a legal duty to
carry. It is quite another thing for government to forbid citizens of the white and
black races from travelling in the same public conveyance, and to punish officers of
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Harlan observed, if these discriminations were permissible as
to race, then they would be equally permissible for other
characteristics; Harlan thus asked, "if this statute of Louisiana is
consistent with the personal liberty of citizens, why may not the
State require the separation in railroad coaches of native and
naturalized citizens of the United States, or of Protestants and
Roman Catholics?"44
Perhaps most importantly, Harlan's description of the railroads
as fiduciaries for the public interest set the groundwork, early on,
for his assault on Justice Brown's distinction between social and
civil rights. If segregation by the railroads was segregation in the
context of a public highway operated for public use, it arguably
took on more of the characteristics of a "civil right," even in the
relatively narrow sense that Justice Brown was using the term.
And indeed, the very first sentence to follow his discussion of
the public status of railroads stated: "In respect of civil rights,
common to all citizens, the Constitution of the United States does
not, I think, permit any public authority to know the race of
those entitled to be protected in the enjoyment of such rights." 45
With this sentence, Justice Harlan introduced the first grand
theme of his dissent, the idea that government should be colorblind, that it is not permitted, in the words just quoted, even "to
know the race of those entitled to be protected."46 Yet in the
next breath, there is a qualification-a complexity. Harlan does
not himself seem to be color-blind, nor expect others to be. He
thus writes the peculiar statement that "[e]very true man has
pride of race, and under appropriate circumstances when the
rights of others, his equals before the law, are not to be affected,

railroad companies for permitting persons of the two races to occupy the same
passenger coach. If a State can prescribe, as a rule of civil conduct, that whites and
blacks shall not travel as passengers in the same railroad coach, why may it not so
regulate the use of the streets of its cities and towns as to compel white citizens to
keep on one side of a street and black citizens to keep on the other? Why may it
not, upon like grounds, punish whites and blacks who ride together in street cars or
in open vehicles on a public road or street? Why may it not require sheriffs to assign
whites to one side of a court-room and blacks to the other? And why may it not also
prohibit the commingling of the two races in the galleries of legislative halls or in
public assemblages convened for the consideration of the political questions of the
day?").
44. Id. at 558.
45. Id. at 554 (emphasis added).
46. Id. (emphasis added).
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it is his privilege to express such pride and to take such action
based upon it as to him seems proper."47
The juxtaposition here is both intriguing and revealing. Harlan
seems to be accepting, in some faint degree, the "civil right"
versus "social right" dichotomy of Justice Brown's majority
opinion. By making the extraordinary claim that "every true
man" has "pride of race" and under appropriate circumstances
will "express such pride," he seems to be embracing the notion
that people inevitably do think and act in race-conscious ways,
and that, when contained within the private sphere in which the
rights of others are not affected, race-conscious expression and
action is not a bad thing.
Harlan then writes with reverence about the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, proclaiming: "These
notable additions to the fundamental law were welcomed by the
friends of liberty throughout the world. They removed the race
line from our governmental systems."48
Having thus set matters up, Justice Harlan challenged the
majority's contention that the Louisiana law treated blacks and
whites equally. It is important to bear in mind that the majority
in Plessy actually approached a tentative embrace of Justice
Harlan's premise; the Court did not say that laws passed with
the intent of stamping a particular race with a badge of
inferiority are constitutionally permissible-to the contrary, the
Court's argument seemed to proceed on the assumption that such
laws would indeed run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Court's argument was not that the legislature could
constitutionally brand blacks as inferior, but rather that the
legislature in the case before it had not engaged in any such
branding. 49
But this was simply disingenuous, Harlan argued; the law was
passed to stigmatize African-Americans, Harlan argued. Proof of
this required no investigation into legislative history, no
painstaking parsing of the statutory language, no demonstrations
of social science. "Every one knows" the purposes of the
segregation laws, Harlan lectured, and that was to discriminate

47. Id. (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 555.
49. See Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and
Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1030 (1979).
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against blacks, and only persons "wanting in candor" would
assert the contrary:
Every one knows that the statute in question had its origin
in the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from
railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people
from coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons.
Railroad corporations of Louisiana did not make discrimination among whites in the matter of accommodation for
travellers. The thing to accomplish was, under the guise of
giving equal accommodation for whites and blacks, to compel
the latter to keep to themselves while travelling in railroad
passenger coaches. No one would be so wanting in candor as
to assert the contrary.50

This was Harlan's haunting appeal to candor and conscience,
made all the more powerful by his lack of citation to evidence or
authority. For of course, it was true. Everyone did know the
racist motivation underlying the law, and those who denied
it-including Harlan's seven colleagues in the Court's
majority-were simply lacking in candor and anesthetized in
conscience. And in a vain but valiant effort to awaken that
conscience, Harlan wrote the most famous paragraph in his
nearly 34 years and 14,226 cases51 on the Supreme Courtindeed, one of the most famous passages in the entire history of
American law:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this
country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in
education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will
continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great
heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional
liberty. But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law,
there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of
citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before
the law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerfuL The
law regards man as man, and takes no account of his
surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as
guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved. It
is, therefore, to be regretted that this high tribunal, the final

50. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
51. See Kluger, supra note 7, at 81.
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expositor of the fundamental law of the land, has reached the
conclusion that it is competent for a State to regulate the
enjoyment by citizens of their civil rights solely upon the
basis of race. 52

These magnificent words are poetic, courageous, inspiring.
They provided the lone dissenting ghost that would haunt the
Court until Plessy was repudiated. They stir our most
fundamental instincts about the promise of American life. They
are all of that. But they are not color-blind.
Justice Harlan did not argue that we as a people do not know
color. He argued only that the law does not know it. Conjuring a
ghost of his own, that of the slave Dred Scott, Harlan asserted
that the destinies of blacks and whites in America are
indissolubly linked together, and that laws sanctioning
separation could only sow seeds of race-hate:
In my opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in
time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by
this tribunal in the Dred Scott case. It was adjudged in that
case that the descendants of Africans who were imported into
this country and sold as slaves were not included nor
intended to be included under the word "citizens" in the
Constitution, and could not claim any of the rights and
privileges which that instrument provided for and secured to
citizens of the United States; that at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution they were "considered as a subordinate
and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the
dominant race~ and, whether emancipated or not, yet
remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or
privileges but such as those who held the power and the
government might choose to grant them." The recent
amendments of the Constitution, it was supposed, had
eradicated these principles from our institutions. But it
seems that we have yet, in some of the States, a dominant
race--a superior class of citizens, which assumes to regulate
the enjoyment of civil rights, common to all citizens, upon the
basis of race. The present decision, it may well be
apprehended, will not only stimulate aggressions, more or
less brutal and irritating, upon the admitted rights of colored
citizens, but will encourage the belief that it is possible, by
means of state enactments, to defeat the beneficent purposes

52. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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which the people of the United States had in view when they
adopted the recent amendments of the Constitution, by one of
which the blacks of this country were made citizens of the
United States and of the States in which they respectively
reside, and whose privileges and immunities, as citizens, the
States are forbidden to abridge. Sixty millions of whites are
in no danger from the presence here of eight millions of
blacks. The destinies of the two races, in this country, are
indissolubly linked together, and the interests of both require
that the common government of all shall not permit the seeds
of race hate to be planted under the sanction of law. What
can more certainly arouse race hate, what more certainly
create and perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these
races, than state enactments, which, in fact, proceed on the
ground that colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that
they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by
white citizens? That, as all will admit, is the real meaning of
such legislation as was enacted in Louisiana.53

Again, note Harlan's appeal to self-evident candor. These laws,
he states bluntly, in fact proceed on the assumption that AfricanAmericans are inferior and degraded, something that all will
admit. Something, in fact, that his seven Brethren and most of
the nation denied.
At many times the tone of Harlan's opinion is both prophetic
and apocalyptic. In discussing the many devices of separating the
races in jury rooms and public meeting places that the ruling in
Plessy would countenance, Harlan presciently anticipates the
many indignities of Jim Crow. The bleak side of the human
imagination has an almost inexhaustible capacity for ingenious
variations on the theme of degradation. The abolition of slavery
would have been accomplished, Harlan admonished, but its evil
racist roots would remain alive:
If laws of like character should be enacted in the several
States of the Union, the effect would be in the highest degree
mischievous. Slavery, as an institution tolerated by law
would, it is true, have disappeared from our country, but
there would remain a power in the States, by sinister
legislation, to interfere with the full enjoyment of the
blessings of freedom; to regulate civil rights, common to all
citizens, upon the basis of race; and to place in a condition of

53. Id. at 559·60 (citation omitted).
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legal inferiority a large body of American citizens, now
constituting a part of the political community called the
People ofthe United States ....54

Like Ghandi and Martin Luther King, Jr., after him, Harlan
held the blight of injustice in his own country up to the
conscience of international opinion:
We boast of the freedom enjoyed by our people above all other
peoples. But it is difficult to reconcile that boast with a state
of the law which, practically, puts the brand of servitude and
degradation upon a large class of our fellow-citizens, our
equals before the law. The thin disguise of "equal"
accommodations for passengers in railroad coaches will not
mislead any one, nor atone for the wrong this day done. 55

Yes, Justice Harlan was a prophet, a courageous and inspiring
one. But what, precisely, was his prophecy? Above all else, the
opinion is most cited and most remembered for one sentence:
"Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens. "56
III.

A

THE EVOLVING NEAR-COLOR-BLINDNESS OF THE MODERN COURT

The Recent Voting Rights Cases

Today, of course, our Constitution and laws are not color-blind.
Civil rights laws from the Voting Rights Act to affirmative action
programs of all kinds are race-conscious. The Supreme Court
today permits the government to both ''know" and "tolerate"
racial classifications. Is this the most persistent ghost of Homer
Plessy-the ghost of race-consciousness? Are we still paying the
price for not heeding the call of the prophet Harlan?
One line of argument is that we remain a nation divided on
racial grounds because we remain a nation officially conscious of
race. The true antidote for the majority's views in Plessy, the
argument goes, is the antidote supplied by the lone dissenter in
the case. Until the nation finally embraces Harlan's ideal,
abolishing race-conscious policies from affirmative action to the
Voting Rights Act, we will never know peace, and the ghosts of
Homer Plessy will continue to harass us.

54. Id. at 563-64.
55. Id. at 562.
56. Id. at 559 (emphasis added).

1996]

THE GHOSTS OF HOMER PLESSY

1053

This argument appears to be gaining ground in the Supreme
Court, where a growing number of Justices appear to be
increasingly hostile to any use of race in governmental
classifications. The voting rights decisions of recent terms provide
the most vivid examples of this trend.
1.

Shaw v. Reno

In Shaw v. Reno,51 for example, the Court expressed deepseated suspicion of race-conscious redistricting. The dispute in
Shaw arose when the State of North Carolina became entitled to
an additional twelfth seat in the United States House of
Representatives as a result of the 1990 census. The North
Carolina General Assembly enacted a reapportionment plan that
included one congressional district containing a majority of
African-American residents. Preclearance review is required for
the "covered jurisdictions" under the provisions of section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act.58 The Attorney General refused to accept the
General Assembly's plan, taking the position that the legislature
could have created a second district with a majority of minority
voters.59 In response, the General Assembly passed new
legislation creating a second congressional district with a
majority African-American population.60 It was not, however,
located in the southeastern part of North Carolina, as
recommended by the Attorney General, but rather in the
north-central region of North Carolina, along a corridor formed
by Interstate Highway 85. 61 This plan was challenged by a
group of North Carolinians who alleged that the revised

57. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1993). Under § 5, the jurisdiction must obtain either a
judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia declaring
that the proposed change "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color" or administrative
preclearance from the Attorney General. Id. In North Carolina's case, some 40 of the
state's 100 counties are covered by § 5, and thus are prohibited by law from
implementing changes in a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting"
without federal authorization.
59. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2820. The Attorney General took the position that the
General Assembly should have created a second district that would have given
greater effect to black and Native American voting strength in the southeastern area
of the state. The Attorney General asserted that the state failed to create such a
second district for pretextual reasons. Id.
60. Id. (citing 1991 N.C. Extra Sess. Laws, ch. 7).
61. See id.
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reapportionment scheme was an unconstitutional gerrymander
because it included voting district boundary lines of dramatically
irregular shape. 62
As the Supreme Court described the new plan in Shaw,
"District 1," the first of the two majority-black districts contained
in the revised plan, "is somewhat hook shaped."63 The Court
explained: "Centered in the northeast portion of the State,
[District 1] moves southward until it tapers to a narrow band;
then, with finger-like extensions, it reaches far into the
southern-most part of the State near the South Carolina
border."64 District 1, the Court noted, "has been compared to a
'Rorschach ink-blot test' "65 and a "'bug splattered on a
windshield.' "66
It was "District 12," however, the second majority-black district
created in North Carolina's revised plan, that drew the more
notorious descriptions. As the Court in Shaw described it,
District 12 is "even more unusually shaped."67 District 12 "is
approximately 160 miles long and, for much of its length, no
wider than the I-85 corridor. It winds in snake-like fashion
through tobacco country, financial centers, and manufacturing
areas 'until it gobbles in enough enclaves of black neighborhoods.' "68 District 12's shape, indeed, was all too easily
62. See id. at 2820-21. To set this claim in context, it is important to understand
the basic geography and demographics of North Carolina. North Carolina's geography
consists of an eastern Coastal Plain, a central Piedmont Plateau, and a mountainous
western region. ld. at 2820 (citing HUGH T. LEFLER & ALBERT R. NEWSOM, THE
HISTORY OF A SOUTHERN STATE: NORTH CAROLINA 18-22 (3d ed. 1973)). The votingage population of North Carolina is approximately 78% white, 20% African-American,
1% Native-American, and 1% other ethnic groups. ld. Persons in the "other" group
category are predominately Asian and Asian-American. ld. The African-American
population is somewhat dispersed in the state. African-Americans are a majority of
the general population in only 5 of the state's 100 counties. The largest
concentrations of African-Americans are in the Coastal Plain area, particularly in the
northern sections of the plain. ld. (citing OLE GADE & H. DANIEL STILLWELL, NORTH
CAROLINA: PEOPLE AND ENVIRONMENTS 65-68 (1986)).
Given these demographic patterns, it was quite natural that the North Carolina
General Assembly's original redistricting plan contained one district centered in the
northern part of the eastern Coastal Plain area that had a majority African-American
population. The great debate arose over the attempt to create the second
predominately African-American district.
63. ld.
64. Id.
65. Id. (quoting Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 476 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (Voorhees,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
66. ld. (quoting WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1992, at A14).
67. Id.
68. ld. at 2820-21 (quoting Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 476-77 (E.D.N.C. 1992)
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amenable to parody. The Court in Shaw noted that northbound
and southbound drivers on Interstate 85 sometimes found
themselves in separate districts in one county, only to "trade"
districts when they entered the next county. 69 Towns were
divided into different districts, five counties were cut into three
different districts, and at one point the district was kept
contiguous "only because it intersect[ed] at a single point with
two other districts before crossing over them."70 The Court in
Shaw quoted the quip of a North Carolina state legislator, who
sniped that " '[i]f you drove down the interstate with both car
doors open, you'd kill most of the people in the district.' "71
The Supreme Court's opinion in Shaw was written by Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor. The central theme of the Court's opinion
was that the North Carolina reapportionment plan too closely
resembled the types of invidious racial gerrymandering that the
Court had long condemned under the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court described at length the evils of race discrimination in
the design of voting districts, discrimination that had historically
been used to dilute or disenfranchise African-American voters.
While North Carolina's plan was not designed to hurt AfricanAmericans, but to help them, a majority of the Justices on the
Court clearly felt disturbed, at a very visceral level, at how
openly and blatantly the awkwardly shaped North Carolina
Districts 1 and 12 used race as their defining characteristic.
Thus, Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court stated that the
challenge to North Carolina's plan struck "a powerful historical
chord"72 and remarked that it was "unsettling how closely the
North Carolina plan resembles the most egregious racial
gerrymanders of the past."73
The Court began its analysis by acknowledging that the
Constitution is not color-blind. Race-conscious remedies are
permitted under the Equal Protection Clause; and indeed, race(Voorhees, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
69. Id. at 2821.
70. Id.
71. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1993, at A4).
The Court further noted that District 12 has even inspired poetry: "Ask not for whom
the line is drawn; it is drawn to avoid thee." Bernard Grofman, Would Vince
Lombardi Have Been Right If He Had Said: "When it Comes to Redistricting, Race
Isn't Everything, It's the Only Thing?", 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1237, 1261 n.96 (1993);
see Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2821.
72. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824.
73. Id.
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conscious redistricting is sometimes constitutional. 74 The
problem, as the Court saw it, was how to place limits on this
principle. Does the Constitution permit redistricting plans that
create districts so extremely irregular on their face that they may
rationally be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for
purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting
principles and without sufficiently compelling justification? The
Court concluded that the answer to this question is no.
The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court
argued, "is to prevent the States from purposefully discriminating between individuals on the basis of race." 75 Drawing on its
affirmative action jurisprudence,76 the Court held that all overt
racial classifications must be subjected to strict judicial
scrutiny;77 the Equal Protection Clause, the Court insisted, does
not embody a lower standard of judicial review for the ''benign"
use of racial classifications. 78 Drawing on her own prior opinion
in Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 19 Justice O'Connor observed
that "[e]xpress racial classifications are immediately suspect
because, '[a]bsent searching judicial inquiry ... , there is simply
no way of determining what classifications are ''benign" or
"remedial" and what classifications are in fact motivated by
illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial
politics.' "80

74. See id. ("This Court never has held that race·conscious state decisionmaking is
impermissible in all circumstances.").
75. Id. (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)); see Personnel Adm'r
of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979); see also Washington v. Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 485 (1982).
76. See supra text accompanying notes 109-67.
77. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2825 ("Accordingly, we have held that the Fourteenth
Amendment requires state legislation that expressly distinguishes among citizens
because of their race to be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental
interest."); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277-78 (1986)
(plurality opinion).
78. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824.
79. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
80. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
493 (1989) (plurality opinion)). Justice O'Connor's opinion in Shaw also quoted a prior
statement by Justice Brennan that "a purportedly preferential race assignment may
in fact disguise a policy that perpetuates disadvantageous treatment of the plan's
supposed beneficiaries." United Jewish Org. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S.
144, 172 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part); see Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824.
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2. Miller v. Johnson

More recently, in Miller v. Johnson, 81 the Supreme Court
examined a congressional redistricting plan for the State of
Georgia under the principles announced in Shaw. Justice
Anthony Kennedy's opinion for the Supreme Court in Miller
described the critical Eleventh District in Georgia in highly
unflattering terms:
The Eleventh District lost the black population of Macon, but
picked up Savannah, thereby connecting the black
neighborhoods of metropolitan Atlanta and the poor black
populace of coastal Chatham County, though 260 miles apart
in distance and worlds apart in culture. In short, the social,
political and economic makeup of the Eleventh District tells a
tale of disparity, not community. 82

Elections were held pursuant to the new plan in 1992, and three
black members of Congress were elected from the three majorityblack districts. Five white voters from the Eleventh District sued
to challenge the redistricting plan, alleging that the district was
an unconstitutional gerrymander under the principles of Shaw v.

81. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995). Since 1965 Georgia had been a "covered jurisdiction" for
purposes of the Voting Rights Act, requiring preclearance review under § 5 of the Act
of any change in a standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting. Between
1980 and 1990, one of Georgia's ten congressional districts contained a majority of
black voters. The 1990 Decennial Census indicated that Georgia's population had
grown sufficiently to entitle it to an additional eleventh congressional seat. The
Georgia General Assembly first drew up a plan that included two majority-black
districts, the Fifth and the Eleventh, plus an additional district, the Second, that
contained a 35% black population. The Department of Justice, however, rejected the
plan on preclearance review. The General Assembly tried again. Its second effort
increased the black populations of the three districts, but again resulted in only two
majority-black districts. The Justice Department also rejected this plan. On its third
attempt, the General Assembly created three majority-black districts, following largely
the so-called "max-black" plan drawn by the American Civil Liberties Union for the
General Assembly's black caucus. The key to this plan was the "Macon!Savannall
trade." The dense black population in the Macon region of Georgia was transferred
from the Eleventh District to the Second, converting the Second into a majority-black
district, and the Eleventh District's loss in black population was offset by extending
the Eleventh to include the black populations in the coastal city of Savannah. Id. at
2483-84.
82. Id. at 2484. Quoting from a reference work on American politics, the Court
further observed: " 'Geographically, it is a monstrosity, stretching from Atlanta to
Savannah. Its core is the plantation country in the center of the state, lightly
populated, but heavily black. It links by narrow corridors the black neighborhoods in
Augusta, Savannah and southern DeKalb County.' " Id. (quoting MICHAEL BARONE &
GRANT UJIFUSA, ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 356 (1994)).
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Reno. The district court struck down the plan, holding that race
was the "overriding, predominant force" animating its enactment,
citing the irregular shape of the district, including appendages
drawn for the obvious purpose of capturing additional black
populations.83
In the Supreme Court, the Justice Department and State of
Georgia did not defend the redistricting plan by disputing that
racial motivation was a dominant purpose. Rather, the plan was
defended on the theory that under Shaw a plaintiff must
demonstrate that a district's shape is so bizarre that it is
unexplainable other than on the basis of race. 84 Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion rejected this view, stating that it
erroneously characterized the holding in Shaw. 85 The equal
protection violation in Shaw, the Court explained, was
"analytically distinct"86 from vote dilution claims. The Court
then placed the use of race in drawing congressional districts on
a par with the types of invidious discrimination that had been
struck down in the various cases from the 1950s emanating from
Brown v. Board of Education, 87 stating that "[j]ust as the State
may not, absent extraordinary justification, segregate citizens on
the basis of race in its public parks, buses, golf courses, beaches,
and schools, so did we recognize in Shaw that it may not
separate its citizens into different voting districts on the basis of
race."88 The Court claimed that "[t]he idea is a simple one: At
the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies
the simple command that the Government must treat citizens as
individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious,
sexual or national class."89 Picking up on a theme prominent in
both Shaw and the dissenting opinions in the Court's now-

83. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1372, 1378 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
84. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2485.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 347 u.s. 483 (1954).
88. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2486 (citing New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v.
Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per curiam) (parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903
(1956) (per curiam) (buses); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (golf
courses); Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per
curiam) (beaches); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (schools)).
89. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Arizona Governing
Comm'n for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463
u.s. 1073, 1083 (1983))).
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overruled affirmative action decision in Metro Broadcasting,90
the Court asserted that "[w]hen the State assigns voters on the
basis of race, it engages in the offensive and demeaning
assumption that voters of a particular race, because of their race,
'think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer
the same candidates at the polls.' "91 The Court then explained
that ''bizarreness" was not a constitutional requirement, but
mere evidence of an underlying constitutional violation.92
Elaborating on this theme, the Court further rejected the
argument "that the Equal Protection Clause's general
proscription on race-based decisionmaking does not obtain in the
districting context because redistricting by definition involves
racial considerations," holding that this argument indulged "the
very stereotypical assumptions [that] the Equal Protection Clause
forbids"-namely, "that individuals of the same race share a
single political interest."93 Nevertheless, the Court drew a
distinction between a legislature's awareness of race in drawing
district lines, and situations in which race predominates in the
redistricting process.94 Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment will
not be offended when lines are drawn "in spite of' rather than
''because of'' their racial consequences.95 Applying this standard,
90. 497 u.s. 547 (1990).
91. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2486 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2827
(1993)).
92. Id.
Our observation in Shaw of the consequences of racial stereotyping
was not meant to suggest that a district must be bizarre on its face
before there is a constitutional violation. Nor was our conclusion in Shaw
that in certain instances a district's appearance (or, to be more precise,
its appearance in combination with certain demographic evidence) can
give rise to an equal protection claim, a holding that bizarreness was a
threshold showing, as appellants believe it to be. Our circumspect
approach and narrow holding in Shaw did not erect an artificial rule
barring accepted equal protection analysis in other redistricting cases.
Shape is relevant not because bizarreness is a necessary element of the
constitutional wrong or a threshold requirement of proof, but because it
may be persuasive circumstantial evidence that race for its own sake,
and not other districting principles, was the legislature's dominant and
controlling rationale in drawing its district lines. The logical implication,
as courts applying Shaw have recognized, is that parties may rely on
evidence other than bizarreness to establish race-based districting.
Id. (citation omitted).
93. Id. at 2487.
94. Id. at 2488.
95. Id. (quoting Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
" '[D)iscriminatory purpose' . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as
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the Court agreed with the district court below that race was the
predominant, overriding factor in the Georgia General Assembly's
redistricting plan, and thus applied strict scrutiny to the plan. 96
The critical question then became whether Georgia could
successfully defend itself under the strict scrutiny test by
asserting that it had a compelling governmental interest in
complying with the requirements of the Voting Rights Act.
The Court did not unequivocally state in Miller that
compliance with the Voting Rights Act, standing alone, would
ever automatically satisfy the strict scrutiny test, stating instead
that "[w]hether or not in some cases compliance with the Voting
Rights Act, standing alone, can provide a compelling interest
independent of any interest in remedying past discrimination, it
cannot do so here."97 Reiterating what it had said in Shaw, the
Court in Miller emphasized that compliance with federal
antidiscrimination laws cannot justify race-based districting
when the challenged district "was not reasonably necessary
under a constitutional reading and application of those laws."98
In a rebuke to the Justice Department, the Court then held that
the first two redistricting plans submitted by Georgia were not in
violation of the Voting Rights Act. Those plans, which increased
the number of majority-minority districts from one to two, were
"ameliorative," and thus did not violate the nonretrogression
principle of section 5 of the Act.99 Nor was there any evidence in

awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in
spite of,' its adverse effects." Id. (footnotes and citation omitted). The Court then
summarized the plaintiffs burden in Shaw challenges to districting plans:
The plaintiffs burden is to show, either through circumstantial evidence
of a district's shape and demographics or more direct evidence going to
legislative purpose, that race was the predominant factor motivating the
legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters \vithin or
without a particular district. To make this showing, a plaintiff must
prove that the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting
principles, including but not limited to compactness, contiguity, respect
for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared
interests, to racial considerations. Where these or other race-neutral
considerations are the basis for redistricting legislation, and are not
subordinated to race, a state can "defeat a claim that a district has been
gerrymandered on racial lines."
Id. (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2827 (1993)).
96. Id. at 2490.
97. Id. at 2490-91.
98. Id. at 2491.
99. Id. at 2492.
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the record that Georgia's initial two plans were motivated by any
discriminatory intent. 100 Thus, the Court reasoned, the Justice
Department's refusal to accept Georgia's earlier plans was based
on the Department's own misapplication of the Voting Rights Act;
the Justice Department's further insistence that Georgia adopt a
plan that increased the number of majority-minority districts to
three was an "implicit command that States engage in
presumptively unconstitutional race-based districting." 101
Seeming to rub salt in the Department's wounds, the Court then
suggested that such far-reaching and unconstitutional
interpretations of the Voting Rights Act could bring into question
the very constitutional legitimacy of the Act itself, observing that
if Congress actually intended such a construction of the Act-a
proposition the Court seemed to doubt-then the Act could well
exceed Congress's enforcement authority under the Fifteenth
Amendment. 102
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented. Justice
Ginsburg's dissent examined the history of federal court
intervention into the "political thicket" of apportionment, arguing
that federal court intervention had often been required because
the political system was scarcely open to self-correction. 103
Turning to the merits of the Georgia plan, Justice Ginsburg
disagreed with the Court's conclusion that race "overwhelmed"
the Georgia legislature's traditional districting practices, in the
same sense that race had appeared to overwhelm all other
factors in Shaw. 104 Georgia's Eleventh District, she observed,
was not bizarre, extremely irregular, or irrational on its face. 105
She noted further that in the Georgia legislature nonracial
factors had clearly played an important role, including the
accommodation of "an incumbent State Senator regarding the
placement of the precinct in which his son lived."106 Most
significantly, she took eloquent issue with the majority's failure
to recognize the unique circumstances that justify special judicial
protection of minority voters:

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.

at 2493.
at 2500 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
at 2502.
at 2503.
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Special circumstances justify vigilant judicial inspection to
protect minority voters-circumstances that do not apply to
majority voters. A history of exclusion from state politics left
racial minorities without clout to extract provisions for fair
representation in the lawmaking forum. The equal protection
rights of minority voters thus could have remained
unrealized absent the Judiciary's close surveillance. The
majority, by definition, encounters no such blockage. White
voters in Georgia do not lack means to exert strong pressure
on their state legislators. The force of their numbers is itself
a powerful determiner of what the legislature will do that
does not coincide with perceived majority interests. 107

Justice Ginsburg concluded that the result of Miller and Shaw
would be to put all redistricting plans at risk; only after
litigation, she observed, "will States now be assured that plans
conscious of race are safe."108

B. Affirmative Action and the Fragile Position of "Diversity"
The ghosts of Homer Plessy are also visible in the Supreme
Court's recent treatment of affirmative action. 109 From the
Court's very earliest affirmative action decisions, a majority of
Justices signaled an unwillingness to interpret either the
Fourteenth Amendment or civil rights statutes as imposing a
standard of absolute color-blindness that would bar all raceconscious remedial programs by government. A majority of the
Court in early decisions such as Regents of the University of

107. Id. at 2506 (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153
n.4 (1938)).

108. Id. at 2507 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
109. See generally John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial
Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1974); Richard A. Posner, The Bakke Case
and the Future of "Affirmative Action," 67 CAL. L. REV. 171 (1979); Terrance
Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and the
Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653 (1975); Laurence M. Tribe, Perspectives on
Bakke: Equal Protection, Procedural Fairness, or Structural Justice?, 92 HARv. L. REV.
864 (1979); William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the
Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1979).
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California v. Bakke 110 and Fullilove v. Klutznick, m for
example, squarely rejected Justice Harlan's claim in Plessy that
the Constitution is color-blind. 112 The Court's more recent

110. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). The "reverse-discrimination" question had reached the
Court prior to Bakke in DeFunis u. Odegaard, a case in which a white male
challenged a minority-admissions program at the University of Washington School of
Law. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). The special-admissions program
reserved a portion of the law school class for blacks, Chicanos, American Indians, and
Filipinos. The Court did not reach the merits, holding in a 5-4 decision that the case
was moot because DeFunis was registered for the final term of his third year of law
school by the time the case was argued in the Supreme Court. Justice Douglas,
dissenting on the mootness issue, reached the merits. He wrote that the program was
unconstitutional, stating that the law school must treat each applicant "in a racially
neutral way." Id. at 334 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas adopted a
color-blind equal protection standard, writing that "[i]f discrimination based on race is
constitutionally permissible when those who hold the reins can come up with
'compelling' reasons to justify it, then constitutional guarantees acquire an
accordionlike quality." Id. at 343 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
111. 448 u.s. 448 (1980).
112. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In Regents
of the Uniu. of Cal. u. Bakke, the petitioner, Alan Bakke, challenged the validity of a
special admissions program for minority students at the medical school of the
University of California at Davis. Four members of the Court, Justices Brennan,
White, Marshall, and Blackmun, voted to uphold the special-admissions program,
stating that the "[g]overnment may take race into account when it acts not to
demean or insult any racial group, but to remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by
past racial prejudice." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 325 (Brennan, White, Marshall, &
Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Powell, who cast
the critical swing vote in Bakke, agreed with these Justices that government may in
some circumstances use race as a selective criterion. He held, however, that the
particular race-conscious program used by the Davis Medical School was
constitutionally impermissible because it tended to pursue racial preference for its
own sake, rather than for valid educational reasons. Id. at 307-20 (Powell, J.). The
remaining four Justices never reached the constitutional issue, holding that the Davis
program violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976), which they construed to be color-blind. See id. at 408-21
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Burger, C.J.,
Stewart, & Rehnquist, JJ.). Thus, the peculiar judicial compromise in Bakke approved
in principle the government's use of race as a selective criterion, but struck down the
particular racially selective program before the Court.
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke is particularly important, for his views largely
created the blueprint for the Court's next two decades of affirmative action
jurisprudence. Powell's opinion is a riveting example of a great Supreme Court
Justice struggling to accommodate the competing tugs and pulls of process and
equality thinking. The compromise he reached permitted the use of race as a factor
in admissions to achieve the outcome of a more diverse student body, but only
because "diversity" was perceived by Justice Powell as a goal distinguishable from the
pursuit of an ideal racial balance for its own sake. And Justice Powell in Bakke held
that even if the outcome-oriented goal of pursing education diversity is a permissible
goal under the Constitution, it may be pursued only through a process that is
individualistic in its application. The cruder "group rights" style remedy of setting
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pronouncements on affirmative action, however, seem to have
come closer to a color-blind position.
1.

Adarand Constuctors, Inc. v. Pefia

In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 113 the Supreme Court
narrowed the scope of constitutionally permitted affirmative
action. The case involved the constitutional propriety of clauses
typically found in the contracts of most federal agencies, which
by law must contain a subcontractor compensation clause giving
a prime contractor a financial incentive to hire subcontractors
certified as small businesses controlled by socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals, and requmng the
contractor to presume that such individuals include minorities or
any other individuals found to be disadvantaged by the Small

aside a limited quota of seats for minority members only was simply too brazenly
outcome-centered for Justice Powell to tolerate. Thus Powell approved of the
government's pursuit of pluralism in education, writing that "the attainment of a
diverse student body . . . clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an
institution of higher education." Id. at 311-12 (Powell, J.). Powell proceeded, however,
to focus on the distinction between educational pluralism and racial balance for its
own sake. That distinction is the crucial point in his opinion and thus in the
judgment of the Bakke Court. Powell stated that the Davis Medical School's pursuit
of ethnic pluralism was permissible only as "one element in a range of factors a
university properly may consider in attaining the goal of a heterogeneous student
body." Id. at 314. By contrast, ethnic pluralism pursued for its own sake is neither a
compelling state interest, nor a constitutionally permissible goal: "[p]referring
members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is
discrimination for its own sake. This the Constitution forbids." Id. at 307. Describing
race as one in a wide range of factors that should be considered in the interest of
academic pluralism-a factor incident to developing a student body capable of
enjoying a robust exchange of ideas and perspectives-Powell rejected the argument
that the permissible educational pursuit of diversity requires reserving a specified
number of spaces for a given racial group. On the contrary, Powell argued that a
specific racial quota hinders the attainment of true diversity. In rejecting the idea of
specific quotas, Justice Powell wrote:
[T]he argument misconceives the nature of the state interest that would
justify consideration of race or ethnic background. It is not an interest in
simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified percentage of the student
body is in effect guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic groups,
with the remaining percentage an undifferentiated aggregation of
students. The diversity that furthers a compelling state interest
encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of
which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element.
Petitioner's special admission program, focused solely on ethnic diversity,
would hinder rather than further attainment of genuine diversity.
Id. at 315.
113. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
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Business Administration. 114 The precise dispute arose from
highway construction undertaken by the United States
Department of Transportation in Colorado. The prime contractor
was Mountain Gravel & Construction Company, which solicited
bids for certain guardrail subcontract work. Adarand
Constructors, Inc., a Colorado-based highway construction firm,
submitted the low bid. Gonzales Construction Company, a
company certified as controlled by "socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals," submitted a higher bid, but was
awarded the contract. Under the terms of the prime contract,
Mountain Gravel would receive additional compensation if it
hired such a designated disadvantaged business. 115 Pursuant to
114. Id. at 2102. The Small Business Act (SBA), 72 Stat. 384, as amended, 15
U.S.C. §§ 631-647 (1976), declares it to be "the policy of the United States that small
business concerns, [and] small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals, . . . shall have the maximum practicable
opportunity to participate in the performance of contracts let by any Federal agency."
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(l) (1976)). The Act defines "socially disadvantaged
individuals" as "those who have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or
cultural bias because of their identity as a member of a group without regard to
their individual qualities," id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(5) (1976)), and it defines
"economically disadvantaged individuals" as "those socially disadvantaged individuals
whose ability to compete in the free enterprise system has been impaired due to
diminished capital and credit opportunities as compared to others in the same
business area who are not socially disadvantaged." Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 637(a)(6)(A) (1976)). In furtherance of the stated policy, the Act establishes "[t]he
Government-wide goal for participation by small business concerns owned and
controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals" at "not less than 5
percent of the total value of all prime contract and subcontract awards for each fiscal
year." ld. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 644(g)(l) (1976)). "It also requires the head of each
Federal agency to set agency-specific goals for participation by businesses controlled
by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals." Id.
115. Under the SBA's "8(a) program," which is available to small businesses
controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals as the SBA has
defined those terms, a wide range of benefits are conferred on participating
businesses. ld.; see 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.303-.311, -.403 (1994); 48 C.F.R. subpt. 19.8
(1994). One such benefit is automatic eligibility for subcontractor compensation
provisions. Adarand Constructors, 15 S. Ct. at 2102-03 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(3)(C)
(1976) (conferring presumptive eligibility on anyone "found to be disadvantaged . . .
pursuant to section 8(a) of the Small Business Act")).
To participate in the 8(a) program, a business must be "small," as
defmed in 13 CFR § 124.102 (1994); and it must be 51% owned by
individuals who qualify as "socially and economically disadvantaged,"
§ 124.103. The SBA presumes that Black, Hispanic, Asian Pacific,
Subcontinent Asian, and Native Americans, as well as "members of other
groups designated from time to time by SBA," are "socially
disadvantaged," § 124.105(b)(l). It also allows any individual not a
member of a listed group to prove social disadvantage "on the basis of
clear and convincing evidence," as described in § 124.105(c). Social
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a Department of Transportation appropriations measure, "not
less than 10 percent" of the appropriated funds were to be
expended on certified disadvantaged businesses. 116 When
Adarand lost the subcontract bid to Gonzalez, Adarand sued in
federal court to challenge the constitutionality of the affirmative
action scheme; the lower courts found for the government,
upholding the affirmative action programs. 117
The Supreme Court began by noting that while the programs
at issue spoke in terms of "disadvantaged," a race-neutral
concept, the race-based rebuttable presumption used in the

disadvantage is not enough to establish eligibility, however; SBA also
requires each 8(a) program participant to prove "economic disadvantage"
according to the criteria set forth in § 124.106(a).
[Another SBA program, the "S(d) subcontracting program,"] is limited
to eligibility for subcontracting provisions . . . . In determining eligibility,
the SBA presumes social disadvantage based on membership in certain
minority groups, just as in the 8(a) program, and again appears to
require an individualized, although "less restrictive," showing of economic
disadvantage, § 124.106(b). A different set of regulations, however, says
that members of minority groups wishing to participate in the 8(d)
subcontracting program are entitled to a race-based presumption of social
and economic disadvantage. 48 CFR §§ 19.001, 19.703(a)(2) (1994).
ld. at 2103. The Supreme Court in Adarand confessed "some uncertainty as to
whether participation in the 8(d) subcontracting program requires an individualized
showing of economic disadvantage," but noted that, "[i]n any event, in both the S(a)
and the 8(d) programs, the presumptions of disadvantage are rebuttable if a third
party comes forward with evidence suggesting that the participant is not, in fact,
either economically or socially disadvantaged." ld. (citing 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.111(c)-(d),
124.601-.609 (1994)).
116. Id. (quoting Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of
1987 (STURAA), Pub. L. 100-17, 101 Stat. 132). Section 106(c)(l) of STURAA provides
that "not less than 10 percent" of the appropriated funds "shall be expended with
small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals." Id. (quoting 101 Stat. 145).
STURAA adopts the Small Business Act's definition of "socially and
economically disadvantaged individual," including the applicable
race-based presumptions, and adds that "women shall be presumed to be
socially and economically disadvantaged individuals for purposes of this
subsection."
Id. (quoting 101 Stat. 146, § 106(c)(2)(B)).
117. The District Court granted the Government's motion for summary judgment.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790 F. Supp. 240 (D. Colo. 1992). The Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peiia, 16
F.3d 1537 (lOth Cir. 1994). The Tenth Circuit understood the decision in Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), to have adopted "a lenient standard, resembling
intermediate scrutiny, in assessing" the constitutionality of federal race-based action.
Adarand, 16 F.3d at 1544. Applying that "lenient standard," as further developed in
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), the Court of Appeals upheld
the use of subcontractor compensation clauses. Adarand, 16 F.3d at 1547.

1996]

THE GHOSTS OF HOMER PLESSY

1067

decision to certify a business as "disadvantage" rendered the
classifications at issue classifications based explicitly on race,
thus requiring some level of heightened scrutiny. 118 The Court
turned then to the central issue of the case, whether federal
affirmative action programs should be subjected to less rigorous
judicial scrutiny than state and local programs. 119

118. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2105.
119. Reversing its decision in Metro Broadcasting, the Court held that one standard
should govern review of all affirmative action programs. Two FCC minority preference
policies were at issue in Metro Broadcasting: the FCC's minority preference policies in
comparative licensing proceedings and its minority preference policies for "distress
sales." See 497 U.S. 547, 556-57 (1990). In its comparative licensing process, the FCC
grants "plus points" for minority ownership when evaluating competing applicants for
new licenses. The FCC uses numerous criteria when evaluating applicants for
broadcasting licenses. Those criteria include past broadcast record, efficient use of the
frequency, character, and proposed program service. See id. (citing Policy Statement
on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965)). In 1978 the FCC
announced that minority ownership and participation in management would be
considered as a "plus" factor, to be weighed with all other relevant factors, in
comparative licensure hearings. See id. (citing WPIX, Inc., 68 F.C.C.2d 381, 411-12
(1978)). The Metro Broadcasting Company was in competition with Rainbow
Broadcasting Company for a license to construct and operate a new UHF television
station in Orlando, Florida. Rainbow was ultimately awarded the license over Metro
because Rainbow was 90% Hispanic-owned. An FCC Review Board awarded Rainbow
"substantial enhancement" because it was 90% Hispanic-owned. Rainbow's minority
enhancement points outweighed Metro's local residence and civic participation points.
Id. at 558 (citing Metro Broadcasting, Inc., 99 F.C.C.2d 688 (Rev. Bd. 1984)).
The FCC's minority "distress sale" program permits certain licensees who were in
jeopardy of losing their licenses to sell their licenses to minority-controlled firms.
Normally, when a licensee's qualifications to continue to hold a broadcast license
come into question, the licensee is not allowed to assign or transfer the license until
the FCC has conducted a hearing resolving the licensee's qualifications. Id. at 557.
Exceptions to the rule occur when the licensee is either bankrupt or mentally or
physically disabled. See id. (citing Minority Ownership, 68 F.C.C.2d 979, 983 (1978)).
The minority preference distress sale policy is an exception to that general rule,
allo\ving a broadcaster whose license has been designated for a revocation hearing, or
whose renewal application has been designated for hearing, to assign the license to
an FCC-approved "minority enterprise" at a distress sale price. See id. (citing
Commission Policy Regarding the Advancement of Minority Ownership in
Broadcasting, 92 F.C.C.2d 849, 851 (1982)). The minority ownership must exceed 50%
or be controlling. The price of the distress sale must not exceed 75% of the fair
market value. Id. at 558. Rather than endure a protracted hearing over its
qualifications, the licensee may prefer to sell out to a minority enterprise, even
though the licensee receives less than it might otherwise have obtained from the sale.
The assignee must meet the FCC's basic qualifications.
The Supreme Court upheld both FCC minority preference policies. In a 5-4
decision written by Justice William Brennan, the Court held that the FCC's policies
should be judged by the "intermediate scrutiny" standard of equal protection review,
rather than by "strict scrutiny." Id. at 565. The application of the more lax
intermediate scrutiny test was surprising because the Court had appeared to be
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The Court first reviewed the modern history of equal
protection analysis as applied to the federal government. Many
early pronouncements of the Court refused to extend any equal
protection principles to actions of the federal government, on the
reasoning that the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection
guarantee extends only to the states. 120 As the Court first began
to examine federal action under equal protection principles, the
results were disastrous. The Court in Hirabayashi v. United
States 121 sustained a curfew applicable only to persons of
Japanese ancestry, and in the infamous Korematsu v. United
States 122 sustained the internment of Japanese-Americans in
relocation camps. The best that can be said of these decisions is
that they were the product of wartime hysteria; Congress itself
would, generations later, recognize the injustice that had been
done. 123
The first major watershed in this history came in the Supreme
Court's decision in Bolling v. Sharpe, 124 the federal school
desegregation decision involving schools in Washington, D.C.,
that was the companion case to Brown v. Board of Education. 125
In Bolling, "the Court for the first time explicitly questioned the
existence of any difference between the obligations of the Federal
Government and the States to avoid racial classifications."126
While the Court in Bolling noted that "the 'equal protection of
the laws' is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness
than 'due process of law,' "127 it concluded that, "[i]n view of

settling on the strict scrutiny test as the appropriate standard of review for racial
affinnative action.
120. See Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337 (1943) ("Unlike the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth contains no equal protection clause and it provides
no guaranty against discriminatory legislation by Congress."); Helvering v. Lerner
Stores Corp., 314 U.S. 463, 468 (1941); LaBelle Iron Works v. United States, 256
U.S. 377, 392 (1921) ("Reference is made to cases decided under the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; but clearly they are not in point. The Fifth
Amendment has no equal protection clause." (citations omitted)).
121. 320 u.s. 81 (1943).
122. 323 u.s. 214 (1944).
123. See Pub. L. No. 100-383, § 2(a), 102 Stat. 903 (1988) ("The Congress recognizes
that . . . a grave injustice was done to both citizens and permanent resident aliens of
Japanese ancestry by the evacuation, relocation, and internment of civilians during
World War II.").
124. 347 u.s. 497 (1954).
125. 347 u.s. 483 (1954).
126. Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Peiia, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2107 (1995).
127. Id. (quoting Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)).
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[the] decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from
maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be
unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser
duty on the Federal Government." 128 In all subsequent cases
other than the affirmative action line of decisions, the Supreme
Court after Bolling appeared to apply identical equal protection
standards to all governmental action, without regard to whether
it was a federal or state program being challenged. 129 As
Professor Kenneth Karst observed, "[i]n case after case, fifth
amendment equal protection problems are discussed on the
assumption that fourteenth amendment precedents are
controlling."130
The affirmative action cases, however, were unique. The
Supreme Court, in cases such as Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, 131 Fullilove v. Klutznick/32 Wygant v.
Board of Education, 133 Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 134 and
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC/35 struggled to achieve
consensus on the appropriate standard of review. In Wygant and
Croson, the Court settled on "strict scrutiny'' as the governing
standard for reviewing race-based affirmative action programs
implemented by state and local governments, but first in
Fullilove, and later in Metro Broadcasting, the Court adopted a
more lax standard for federal affirmative action. Adarand
brought this two-tiered approach to an end.

128. Id. (quoting Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500).
129. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) ("Equal protection analysis in
the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment.");
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) ("This Court's approach to
Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to
equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment."); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
130. Kenneth L. Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55
N.C. L. REV. 541, 554 (1977).
131. 438 u.s. 265 (1978).
132. 448 u.s. 448 (1980).
133. 476 u.s. 267 (1986).
134. 488 u.s. 469 (1989).
135. 497 u.s. 547 (1990).
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OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

The Near-Colorblindness of Adarand

The Court in Adarand, although confessing that there
remained ''lingering uncertainty in the details," distilled its
jurisprudence regarding racial classifications into three general
propositions, which it labeled "skepticism," "consistency," and
"congruence."136 By "skepticism," the Court meant that all
preferences based on racial or ethnic criteria must reserve a
most searching examination-that is, be subjected to strict
scrutiny. 137 By "consistency," the Court meant that it makes no
difference what racial or ethnic group is being preferred; "'the
standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not
dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a
particular classification.' m 38 And by "congruence," the Court
meant that equal protection analysis as applied to the states
under the Fourteenth Amendment is identical to that applied to
the federal government under the Fifth. 139 To the extent that
Metro Broadcasting conflicted with these principles, it was
overruled. 140
Having established the standard of review, the Court in
Adarand did not resolve the question of whether the program
before it was or was not constitutional. Instead, because the
lower courts had upheld the program under too lenient a
standard, the Court remanded the case to them for their initial
determination of whether, applying strict scrutiny, the programs
are constitutional. 141 However, the Court made some general
observations about the content of the strict scrutiny standard.
Most importantly, the Court went out of its way "to dispel the
notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in
fact.' "142 There are situations, the Court emphasized, in which
affirmative action is constitutional:

136. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefla, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2111 (1995).
137. Id.
138. Id. (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (plurality
opinion)).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2114-18.
141. Id. at 2118.
142. Id. at 2117.
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Finally, we wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is
"strict in theory, but fatal in fact." The unhappy persistence
of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial
discrimination against minority groups in this country is an
unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from
acting in response to it. As recently as 1987, for example,
every Justice of this Court agreed that the Alabama
Department of Public Safety's "pervasive, systematic, and
obstinate discriminatory conduct" justified a narrowly
tailored race-based remedy. When race-based action is
necessary to further a compelling interest, such action is
within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the "narrow
tailoring" test this Court has set out in previous cases. 143

Beyond this general admonition that the strict scrutiny
standard does not absolutely forbid the use of race, however, the
opinion in Adarand only prolonged, to use the Court's own
phrase, the ''lingering uncertainty in the details." 144
Concurring opinions were filed in Adarand by Justices Scalia
and Thomas. Justice Scalia wrote: "Individuals who have been
wronged by unlawful racial discrimination should be made whole;
but under our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a
creditor or a debtor race." 145 Although Justice Scalia joined in
the disposition of the case by the Court, including its application
of strict scrutiny, he noted that in his view:
[G]overnment can never have a 'compelling interest' in
discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for
past racial discrimination in the opposite direction. . . . To
pursue the concept of racial entitlement--even for the most
admirable and benign of purposes-is to reinforce and
preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that
produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred. In the
eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is
American. 146

143. Id. at 2117 (citations omitted). The phrase "strict in theory, but fatal in fact" is
taken from Justice Thurgood Marshall. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519
(1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment). The example of the remedies approved
in the Alabama case referred to in the Court's statement is from United States v.
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.).
144. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111.
145. Id. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
146. Id. at 2118-19.
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Justice Thomas expressed quite passionate dislike for all
affirmative action:
Government cannot make us equal; it can only recognize,
respect, and protect us as equal before the law.
That these programs may have been motivated, in part, by
good intentions cannot provide refuge from the principle that
under our Constitution, the government may not make
distinctions on the basis of race. As far as the Constitution is
concerned, it is irrelevant whether a government's racial
classifications are drawn by those who wish to oppress a race
or by those who have a sincere desire to help those thought
to be disadvantaged. There can be no doubt that the
paternalism that appears to lie at the heart of this program
is at war with the principle of inherent equality that
underlies and infuses our Constitution.
These programs not only raise grave constitutional
questions, they also undermine the moral basis of the equal
protection principle. Purchased at the price of immeasurable
human suffering, the equal protection principle reflects our
Nation's understanding that such classifications ultimately
have a destructive impact on the individual and our society.
Unquestionably, "[i]nvidious [racial] discrimination is an
engine of oppression." It is also true that "[r]emedial" racial
preferences may reflect "a desire to foster equality in society."
But there can be no doubt that racial paternalism and its
unintended consequences can be as poisonous and pernicious
as any other form of discrimination. So-called "benign"
discrimination teaches many that because of chronic and
apparently immutable handicaps, minorities cannot compete
with them without their patronizing indulgence. Inevitably,
such programs engender attitudes of superiority or,
alternatively, provoke resentment among those who believe
that they have been wronged by the government's use of race.
These programs stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority
and may cause them to develop dependencies or to adopt an
attitude that they are "entitled" to preferences ....
In my mind, government-sponsored racial discrimination
based on benign prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination
inspired by malicious prejudice. In each instance, it is racial
discrimination, plain and simple. 147

147. Id. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(citations and footnote omitted).
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B. The Diversity Rationale After Adarand
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer all dissented.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens is particularly
important, for it addresses an important question left open by the
majority in Adarand: Whether Adarand's overruling of Metro
Broadcasting reaches only the question of the appropriate
standard of review, or extends to the other key feature of Metro
Broadcasting-its reliance on the "diversity" rationale. The
question of whether public entities such as universities may
engage in affirmative action to achieve greater diversity is
central to answering the assertion by the Plessy majority that
law cannot place the races on an equal social plane. 148 For the
pursuit of diversity is in many respects the pursuit of that which
the Plessy majority denied was possible and Justice Harlan
claimed was essential: the recognition that the destinies of the
two races are indissolubly linked together.
In Bakke, 149 Justice Powell approved of the interest of the
university in achieving a diverse student body as a "compelling"
interest for the purposes of the strict scrutiny test:
The fourth goal asserted by petitioner is the attainment of
a diverse student body. This clearly is a constitutionally
permissible goal for an institution of higher education.
Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated
constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special
concern of the First Amendment. The freedom of a university
to make its own judgments as to education includes the
selection of its student body. 150

Justice Powell understood the goal of obtaining a diverse student
body as among the "four essential freedoms" that comprise the
"academic freedom" of a university. 151 Quoting the words of the

148. See supra notes 15-40 and accompanying text.
149. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
150. Id. at 311-12.
151. Id. at 312 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
"It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is
most conducive to speculation, experinlent and creation. It is an
atmosphere in which there prevail 'the four essential freedoms' of a
university-to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach,
what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted
to study."
Id.; see also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
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President of Princeton University, Justice Powell observed that
the speculation, experiment, and creation so essential to higher
education is promoted by a diverse student body:
[A] great deal of learning occurs informally. It occurs through
interactions among students of both sexes; of different races,
religions, and backgrounds; who come from cities and rural
areas, from various states and countries; who have a wide
variety of interests, talents, and perspectives; and who are
able, directly or indirectly, to learn from their differences and
to stimulate one another to reexamine even their most deeply
held assumptions about themselves and their world. As a
wise graduate of ours observed in commenting on this aspect
of the educational process, 'People do not learn very much
when they are surrounded only by the likes of
themselves.' . . . In the nature of things, it is hard to know
how, and when, and even if, this informal 'learning through
diversity' actually occurs. It does not occur for everyone. For
many, however, the unplanned, casual encounters with
roommates, fellow sufferers in an organic chemistry class,
student workers in the library, teammates on a basketball
squad, or other participants in class affairs or student
government can be subtle and yet powerful sources of
improved understanding and personal growth. 152

Justice Powell thus concluded that "it is not too much to say that
the 'nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure' to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this
Nation of many peoples."153 Seeking a diverse student body,
Justice Powell explained, is thus "a goal that is of paramount
importance in the fulfillment of its mission."154
The goal of diversity, Justice Powell further argued, is as
important for professional and graduate education as for the

Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom which
is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers
concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First
Amendment. . . . The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers
truth "out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of
authoritative selection."
Id. (quoting United States v. Associated Press, D.C., 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (1943)).
152. Id. at 312 n.48 (alterations in original) (quoting William G. Bowen, Admissions
and the Relevance of Race, PRINCETON ALUMNI WKLY., Sept. 26, 1977, at 7, 9).
153. Id. at 313.
154. Id.
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undergraduate level, noting that "even at the graduate level, our
tradition and experience lend support to the view that the
contribution of diversity is substantial."155 Citing Sweatt v.
Painter, 156 Powell observed that in law schools, for example, the
exchange of ideas among students of diverse backgrounds is
critical to the learning experience. 157
Justice Powell's quarrel with what the University of California
had done in Bakke to achieve diversity was not with its ends, but
its means. For Justice Powell, in order for a university's pursuit
of "diversity" to be constitutionally valid, the pursuit must
embrace the ideal of diversity in a broad and inclusive sense, and
not limit that pursuit to race or ethnicity alone:
Ethnic diversity, however, is only one element in a range
of factors a university properly may consider in attaining the
goal of a heterogeneous student body. Although a university
must have wide discretion in making the sensitive judgments
as to who should be admitted, constitutional limitations
protecting individual rights may not be disregarded. 158

The key to Justice Powell's endorsement of the diversity idea
was that it be pursued in a "unified" admissions system, without
set-asides or special "tracks" for particular racial or ethnic
groups:
It may be assumed that the reservation of a specified
number of seats in each class for individuals from the
preferred ethnic groups would contribute to the attainment of
considerable ethnic diversity in the student body. But
petitioner's argument that this is the only effective means of
serving the interest of diversity is seriously flawed. In a most
fundamental sense the argument misconceives the nature of
the state interest that would justifY consideration of race or
ethnic background. It is not an interest in simple ethnic

155. Id.
156. 339 u.s. 629 (1950).
157. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314.
The law school, the proving ground for legal learning and practice,
cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions with
which the law interacts. Few students and no one who has practiced law
would choose to study in an academic vacuum, removed from the
interplay of ideas and the exchange of views with which the law is
concerned.
Id. (citing Sweatt v. Painter, 399 U.S. 629, 634 (1950)).
158. Id.
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diversity, in which a specified percentage of the student body
is in effect guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic
groups, with the remaining percentage an undifferentiated
aggregation of students. The diversity that furthers a
compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of
qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic
origin is but a single though important element. Petitioner's
special admissions program, focused solely on ethnic
diversity, would hinder rather than further attainment of
genuine diversity.
Nor would the state interest in genuine diversity be served
by expanding petitioner's two-track system into a multitrack
program with a prescribed number of seats set aside for each
identifiable category of applicants. Indeed, it is inconceivable
that a university would thus pursue the logic of petitioner's
two-track program to the illogical end of insulating each
category of applicants with certain desired qualifications from
competition with all other applicants. 159
Justice Powell then touted, as an example of the appropriate
and constitutional pursuit of diversity, the admissions process at
Harvard, in which "ethnic background may be deemed a 'plus' in
a particular applicant's file, yet it does not insulate the
individual from comparison with all other candidates for the
available seats." 16° For Justice Powell, this preserved an
appropriate balance between the goal of diversity and the
constitutional imperative that government treat individuals as

159. Id. at 315 (footnote omitted).
160. Id. at 317. Elaborating, Justice Powell wrote:
The file of a particular black applicant may be examined for his potential
contribution to diversity without the factor of race being decisive when
compared, for example, with that of an applicant identified as an
Italian-American if the latter is thought to exhibit qualities more likely
to promote beneficial educational pluralism. Such qualities could include
exceptional personal talents, unique work or service experience, leadership
potential, maturity, demonstrated compassion, a history of overcoming
disadvantage, ability to communicate with the poor, or other
qualifications deemed important. In short, an admissions program
operated in this way is flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements
of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and
to place them on the same footing for consideration, although not
necessarily according them the same weight. Indeed, the weight
attributed to a particular quality may vary from year to year depending
upon the "mix" both of the student body and the applicants for the
incoming class.
Id. at 317-18.
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individuals, and not fungible commodities of a racial or ethnic
class:
This kind of program treats each applicant as an
individual in the admissions process. The applicant who loses
out on the last available seat to another candidate receiving a
"plus" on the basis of ethnic background will not have been
foreclosed from all consideration for that seat simply because
he was not the right color or had the wrong surname. It
would mean only that his combined qualifications, which may
have included similar nonobjective factors, did not outweigh
those of the other applicant. His qualifications would have
been weighed fairly and competitively, and he would have no
basis to complain of unequal treatment under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 161

Following Bakke, however, the diversity rationale did not play
a significant role in many Supreme Court affirmative action
cases. The issue came up in Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education/62 in which Justice Stevens argued that "race is not
always irrelevant to . . . governmental decisionmaking, "163 and
the Court, in the opinion of Justice O'Connor, noted in response
that although the school board in Wygant had relied on an
interest in providing black teachers to serve as role models for
black students, that interest "should not be confused with the
very different goal of promoting racial diversity among the
faculty." 164 J\].stice O'Connor added that, because the school
board had not relied on an interest in diversity, it was not
"necessary to discuss the magnitude of that interest or its
applicability in this case."165
161. Id. at 318 (footnote omitted). In a footnote, Justice Powell again emphasized
the "case-by-case" nature of a proper admissions program:
Universities . . . may make individualized decisions, in which ethnic
background plays a part, under a presumption of legality and legitimate
educational purpose. So long as the university proceeds on an
individualized, case-by-case basis, there is no warrant for judicial
interference in the academic process. If an applicant can establish that
the institution does not adhere to a policy of individual comparisons, or
can show that a systematic exclusion of certain groups results, the
presumption of legality might be overcome, creating the necessity of
proving legitimate educational purpose.
Id. at 319 n.53.
162. 476 u.s. 267 (1986).
163. Id. at 314-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 288 n.*.
165. Id.
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Prior to Metro Broadcasting, a majority of the Court had not
yet decided whether the interest in promoting diversity was an
interest of sufficient magnitude to justify a racial classification.
Metro Broadcasting, of course, answered that question in the
affirmative; the FCC did not defend its program on the theory
that it was remedial, but rather on the theory that it was
intended to achieve diversity in broadcasting. Justice Stevens, in
his opinion in Adarand, dealt with whether the diversity aspect
of Metro Broadcasting had been affected by the Court's ruling,
and argued that it had not:
The majority today overrules Metro Broadcasting only insofar
as it is "inconsistent with [the] holding" that strict scrutiny
applies to "benign" racial classifications promulgated by the
Federal Government. The proposition that fostering diversity
may provide a sufficient interest to justify such a program is
not inconsistent with the Court's holding today-indeed, the
question is not remotely presented in this case-and I do not
take the Court's opinion to diminish that aspect of our
decision in Metro Broadcasting. 166

This statement by Justice Stevens is of enormous importance
for those institutions, such as universities, that often base
affirmative action programs on the interest in creating diversity
among students and faculty. If Justice Stevens is correct, those
programs, most of which have drawn their claim to constitutional
legitimacy from Justice Powell's famous opinion in Bakke, remain
constitutionally sound after Adarand, provided they comply with
the requirements of "narrow tailoring."
CONCLUSION: WILL WE EVER BANISH HOMER PLESSY'S GHOSTS?

.Ai3 the contemporary Court struggles toward an ever more
color-blind Constitution, it is worth considering more carefully
the spirit of Justice Harlan's famous dissent. We must face
Harlan head-on. When we do, we find that Justice Harlan and
his color-blindness turn out to be a great deal more complex than
the sound-bite "Our Constitution is color-blind" initially reveals.
For all its moral courage and rhetorical power, for all its
insistence that the law be color-blind, Harlan is unable, entirely,
to escape his own time and culture-as the ghosts of his opinion

166. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peiia, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2127-28 (1995) (citation
omitted).
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are unable to escape ours. Justice Harlan saw the world in color,
and so do we. When I read Harlan's dissent in class each year
with my students, I ask them what they make of all the openly
stereotypical allusions to racial and ethnic groups in the opinion.
Here they are, once again paraded in open view:
Every true man has pride of race, and under appropriate
circumstances when the rights of others, his equals before the
law, are not to be affected, it is his privilege to express such
pride and to take such action based upon it as to him seems
proper....
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this
country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in
education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will
continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great
heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional
liberty....
. . . This question is not met by the suggestion that social
equality cannot exist between the white and black races in
this country. That argument, if it can be properly regarded as
one, is scarcely worthy of consideration; for social equality no
more exists between two races when travelling in a passenger
coach or a public highway than when members of the same
races sit by each other in a street car or in the jury box, or
stand or sit with each other in a political assembly, or when
they use in common the streets of a city or town, or when
they are in the same room for the purpose of having their
names placed on the registry of voters, or when they
approach the ballot-box in order to exercise the high privilege
of voting.
There is a race so different from our own that we do not
permit those belonging to it to become citizens of the United
States. Persons belonging to it are, with few exceptions,
absolutely excluded from our country. I allude to the Chinese
race. But by the statute in question, a Chinaman can ride in
the same passenger coach with white citizens of the United
States, while citizens of the black race in Louisiana, many of
whom, perhaps, risked their lives for the preservation of the
Union, who are entitled, by law, to participate in the political
control of the State and nation, who are not excluded, by law
or by reason of their race, from public stations of any kind,
and who have all the legal rights that belong to white
citizens, are yet declared to be criminals, liable to
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imprisonment, if they ride in a public coach occupied by
citizens of the white race. 167

Now what are we to make of these passages? They are
haunting, too, but in a different and more vivid hue than
Harlan's color-blind Constitution. For if the Constitution, to
Justice Harlan, was color-blind, he surely was not. And neither
was his celebrated opinion.
And for all Harlan's moving rhetoric, the Constitution he
expounded was not color-blind, not prior to the Civil War, not
after, not now. We know that the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not understand the law they were enacting as
turning the Constitution color-blind-they did not understand,
for example, the Fourteenth Amendment to abolish racially
segregated public schools. 168
Witness Justice Harlan's actions in 1899, three years after
Plessy, when the Court for the first time heard a challenge to
racially separate schools. In Richmond County, Georgia, the
district ran separate high schools for blacks, white girls, and
white boys. When the district's school buildings became
overcrowded, the black high school was shut down and converted
into an elementary school, leaving black high school children in
the district with no public school to attend. Relying on the
majority opinion in Plessy, parents of the black children sued,
claiming that at the very least they were entitled to separate but
equal schools. The Supreme Court in Cumming v. County Board
of Education 169 rejected their claim in a unanimous opinion
written by none other than Justice Harlan himself. Justice
Harlan's opinion in Cumming has no hint of candor or moral
outrage. It is a whitewash job well worthy of the Plessy majority.
There was in Cumming some sleight-of-hand by the school
district. But unlike in Plessy, where Justice Harlan cut through
all euphemism and pretext, in Cumming he positively aided and
abetted. The district had a tax-supported high school for white
females. It had no tax-supported school for white males, as
Harlan explained the facts, although it did use tax moneys to
"assist" a "private" school in the county for white males. There

167. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 554, 559, 561 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
168. Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision,
69 HAR.v. L. REV. 1, 56 (1955); Laurence H. Tribe, In What Vision of the Constitution
Must the Law be Color-Blind?, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 201, 204 (1986).
169. 175 u.s. 528 (1899).
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was no high school for black males or females that either got
direct tax support or any financial assistance from the school
district. On this set of facts, Justice Harlan simply flitted away
the constitutional claim, arguing that, if anything, it was a case
of sex discrimination, not race discrimination:
The only complaint is that these plaintiffs, being taxpayers,
are debarred the privilege of sending their children to a high
school which is not a free school, but one where tuition is
charged, and that a portion of the school fund, raised by
taxation, is appropriated to sustain white high schools to
which negroes are not admitted. We think we have shown
that it was in the discretion of the Board to establish high
schools. It being in their discretion, they could, without a
violation of the law or of any constitution, devote a portion of
the taxes collected for school purposes to the support of this
high school for white girls and to assist a county
denominational high school for boys. In our opinion, it is
impracticable to distribute taxes equally. The appropriation
of a portion of the taxes for a white girls' high school is not
more discrimination against these colored plaintiffs than it is
against many white people in the county. A taxpayer who has
boys and no girls of a school age has as much right to
complain of the unequal distribution of the taxes to a girls'
high school as have these plaintiffs. The action of the Board
appears to us to be more a discrimination as to sex than it
does as to race. 170

This is a remarkable passage on several counts. First, note
that the possibility that the greater form of discrimination here
may be discrimination based on gender seems to be introduced as
no more than a rhetorical twitter. This ghost has largely been
exorcized from our constitutional system, although the Supreme
Court even in its 1995-96 term is entertaining the question of
separate but equal for all-male military academies. More
important, however, is Justice Harlan's astonishing treatment of
the race issue in Cumming. Justice Harlan's blindness here is
not to color but to basic justice, for surely the principle of Plessy
must have meant, at minimum, that when tax moneys are used
to establish some program of public largess, such as a school
system, there must be equal opportunities for both races, even if
"separate." Consider further his cavalier analysis of the Georgia

170. Id. at 542-43.
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constitutional provision171 that required separation of the races
in public schools:
It was said at the argument that the vice in the common
school system of Georgia was the requirement that the white
and colored children of the State be educated in separate
schools. But we need not consider that question in this case.
No such issue was made in the pleadings. Indeed, the
plaintiffs distinctly state that they have no objection to the
tax in question so far as levied for the support of primary,
intermediate and grammar schools, in the management of
which the rule as to the separation of races is enforced. We
must dispose of the case as it is presented by the record.
The plaintiffs in error complain that the Board of
Education used the funds in its hands to assist in
maintaining a high school for white children without
providing a similar school for colored children. The
substantial relief asked is an injunction that would either
impair the efficiency of the high school provided for white
children or compel the Board to close it. But if that were
done, the result would only be to take from white children
educational privileges enjoyed by them, without giving to
colored children additional opportunities for the education
furnished in high schools. The colored school children of the
county would not be advanced in the matter of their
education by a decree compelling the defendant Board to
cease giving support to a high school for white children. The
Board had before it the question whether it should maintain,
under its control, a high school for about sixty colored
children or withhold the benefits of education in primary
schools from three hundred children of the same race. It was
impossible, the Board believed, to give educational facilities
to the three hundred colored children who were unprovided
for, if it maintained a separate school for the sixty children
who wished to have a high school education. Its decision was
in the interest of the greater number of colored children,
leaving the smaller number to obtain a high school education

171. See id. at 543.
"There shall be a thorough system of common schools for the education
of children in the elementary branches of an English education only, as
nearly uniform as practicable, the expenses of which shall be provided for
by taxation, or otherwise. The schools shall be free to all children of the
State, but separate schools shall be provided for the white and colored
races."
ld. (quoting GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1).
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in existing private institutions at an expense not beyond that
incurred in the high school discontinued by the Board. 172

This from the Justice who wrote that our Constitution is colorblind, and that "[t]here is no caste here." Making matters
worse-indeed, charting an argumentative strategy that would be
used to block efforts to overturn Jim Crow over the next
century-Harlan proceeded to defend the blatant discrimination
in Cumming with the soothing insulation of federalism and
states' rights:
We may add that while all admit that the benefits and
burdens of public taxation must be shared by citizens without
discrimination against any class on account of their race, the
education of the people in schools maintained by state
taxation is a matter belonging to the respective States, and
any interference on the part of Federal authority with the
management of such schools cannot be justified except in the
case of a clear and unmistakable disregard of rights secured
by the supreme law of the land. We have here no such case to
be determined .... 173

George Wallace, Lester Maddox, or Orval Faubus at their worst
could not have said it better.
Laws that impose separation are not the same, morally or
constitutionally, as laws that promote combination. The moral
principle animating the advocates of a truly color-blind
Constitution is certainly powerful. It is the principle that raceconsciousness is wrong, wrong in all contexts, perhaps, but at the
very least, wrong when the government indulges in it. But there
are counter-principles of substantial weight. The lingering
difficulty many African-Americans continue to have in placing
themselves in the nation's competitive public and private
institutions quite simply is, without doubt, caused in part by the
lingering effects of hundreds of years of group degradation.
A decade after Brown v. Board of Education, 174 when the
Supreme Court held that a mere move by a school district to a
"freedom of choice" plan was not sufficient to dismantle, root and
branch, the regime of separate but equal, the Court well and
properly understood that so many years of evil will not be

172. Id. at 543·44.
173. Id. at 545.
174. 347 u.s. 483 (1954).
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undone by a surface move to "neutrality." Many school boards
responded to the Brown ruling first by dragging their feet or
resisting, and then finally by adopting "freedom of choice" plans
that let school children enroll in any school in the school district.
A freedom of choice plan is ostensibly a perfect form of equality,
and to a pure process thinker may seem like all any school board
could ever be asked to do. The problem, however, is that in most
of those freedom of choice school districts, black children
continued to attend the exclusively black schools and white
children the exclusively white schools, and so it appeared in
reality as if nothing had changed. In Green v. County School
Board of New Kent County/75 the Court in 1968 announced that
simply moving to such a freedom of choice regime was not good
enough. If a school district had been guilty of intentional
segregation of its students, and thus guilty of a constitutional
violation under Brown, the remedy must be more aggressive; the
school district was under an "affirmative duty" to dismantle the
vestiges of the discriminatory system "root and branch." The
Court wanted results; it wanted them now. In Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 176 Chief Justice
Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, stated that school boards
could voluntarily adopt prescribed ratios of black students to
white students for each school within a system, even in the
absence of a constitutional violation, 177 although the Court also
admonished that it would not approve the notion that there is a
"substantive constitutional right" to "any particular degree of
racial balance or mixing."178 The Court in Swann recognized the
power of a school board faced with a history of segregation to use
its awareness of the racial imbalance as a starting point for
voluntarily dismantling a dual school system. 179
If we understand that affirmative steps were required to
dismantle the formal mechanisms of separate but equal, why do
175. 391 u.s. 430 (1968).
176. 402 u.s. 1 (1971).
177. ld. at 16.
178. ld. at 24.
179. Id. at 25. For the definitive treatment of the Charlotte desegregation story, see
DAVISON DOUGLAS, READING, WRITING, & RACE: THE DESEGREGATION OF THE
CHARLOTTE SCHOOLS (1995). See also United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992)
(applying Brown principles to the desegregation of higher education in Mississippi).
For an excellent treatment of Fordice, see Kay P. Kindred, Civil Rights and Higher
Education, in A YEAR IN THE LIFE OF THE SUPREME COURT 208-30 (Rodney Smolla
ed., 1995).
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we find it so difficult to understand that affirmative steps are
required to dismantle the psychological and cultural effects? AE,
Kimberle Williams Crenshaw has explained, the subordination of
blacks in American society exists on many levels. 18° Formal,
legal subordination of the type approved in Plessy is surely the
worst, for it legitimizes and encourages all other forms of
subordination, and is fed by a perverse normative vision of
equality, a vision in which people of color are not full members of
the polity. Other forms of subordination persist, however, long
after formal legal subordination is abolished. Material
subordination exists in the form of discrimination in employment,
housing, or education, as well as in lives degraded by poverty,
poor health care, and violence. 181 Symbolic subordination
persists in the pervasiveness of a race-consciousness that
embraces myths of inferiority. 182 Taking down the "Whites
Only'' signs was an important legal step, for it rejected the
principle of racial supremacy as the nation's moral vision, but
can hardly have been expected to cure material or symbolic
subordination, and indeed has not.
Quite to the contrary, the elimination of formal legal
subordination, when juxtaposed with the momentum of economic
subordination and cultural prejudice that had developed for three
centuries, may actually have fed the persistence of prejudice.
Here is the simple-minded equation: African-Americans no longer
have any formal barriers to equal opportunity, but many still are
not making it. They must be inferior after all. And "[i]f whites
believe that Blacks, because they are unambitious or inferior, get
what they deserve, it becomes that much harder to convince
whites that something is wrong with the entire system."183
Both sides in the affirmative action debate can summon moral
indignation. Those who advocate color-blindness can argue that
affirmative action is, in its way, racist, for it continues the habits
and patterns of race-consciousness, and indulges the assumption
that minority groups cannot make it on their own. 184 Those who
defend affirmative action can argue that the advocates of color-

180. Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1377-78 (1988).
181. Id. at 1377.
182. Id.
183. ld. at 1380-81.
184. See Van Alsytne, supra note 109.
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blindness are racist in their own way. For although they proudly
tout formal equality, the practical impact of their policies and
their insensitivity to the causal lines that still emanate from
slavery, Dred Scott, Plessy, and their many ghosts, make them
enemies of persons of color.
For many African-Americans, one of the bewildering aspects of
obstructionist principles advanced by some whites is the
apparently sincere request that the damage done to AfricanAmericans is "nothing personal." In the words of Derrick Bell's
character Geneva Crenshaw:
"You know, friend, we civil rights lawyers spend our lives
confronting whites in power with the obvious racial bias in
their laws or policies, and while, as you know, the litany of
their possible exculpatory responses is as long as life, they all
boil down to: 'That's the way the world is. We did not make
the rules, we simply play by them, and you really have no
alternative but to do the same. Please don't take it
personally.' "185

To escalate the rhetoric in this way damages both sides, however,
and only sets back the cause of racial justice in America.
Our dialogue would be more fruitful if each side recognized the
good faith of the other, and conceded to the other the legitimacy
of the other's animating moral impulses. Those against
affirmative action should understand and empathize with the
world view of those who advocate it. The mainstream advocates
of affirmative action do not seek a system of racial spoils. They
do not seek to perpetuate stereotypes and stigma. They do not
argue that people of color cannot make it in society without help.
They argue, rather, that many persons of color still suffer the
lingering effects of past discrimination, and that Justice Harlan
was right in his prophecy that the destinies of the two races are
"indissolubly linked together." Moderate and flexible affirmative
action policies that genuinely diversify our public and private
institutions are the only path toward achieving in fact the links
that persons of all racial and ethnic groups must feel toward one
another if future community in this nation is to be possible.
The issue of stigma, for example, is far more complex than the
public rhetoric of opponents of affirmative action admit. A law
stigmatizes when it places on an individual a symbol that

185. DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 44 (1987).
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degrades or humiliates. 186 It is the cultural and historical
context that makes the symbol degrading; thus, as Charles
Lawrence explains, separate-but-equal bathrooms for men and
women are not ordinarily understood in our culture as degrading
to either sex; while separate-but-equal bathrooms for blacks and
whites are. 187 We understand from our cultural and historical
experience that the message communicated by a bathroom sign
that says ''Whites Only'' is that blacks are unfit to defecate there:
blacks are dirty, or dangerous, or less than fully human-their
presence can defile and contaminate even a bathroom.
Affirmative action programs in modern times simply do not
carry any equivalent social and cultural message of stigma.
Indeed, programs that are premised on enhancing diversity may
actually be understood to carry a positive message about the
person of color admitted to an institution: the message being that
the institution values and needs the individual for the
experiences and viewpoints that the individual brings to the
community.
At the same time, proponents of affirmative action must
recognize the validity of the moral principle advanced by
opponents of affirmative action, and the cogency of many of the
arguments that are advanced against its more draconian forms.
There should come a day when such programs are no longer
needed or tolerated. But we are not there yet. illtimately, the pursuit of genuine racial equality in the
country must focus on substance and not on form. Self-reliance
and personal responsibility are crucial. The emphasis on those
values in forums such as the Million Man March are an
important symbolic step. A serious grappling with the social
infrastructure of society, including meaningful progress in
education, drug abuse, child care and family support, welfare
reform, and crime are obviously the most important of all. But
the single most critical determinant of success will be our ability
to foster cross-racial tolerance and community. This will require
a continued emphasis on policies of inclusion, such as affirmative
action, but in forms that do everything possible to meet the
legitimate objections to the excesses of some such policies, forms
that create the least moral backlash. It is only through these
186. Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 350-51 (1987).
187. Id.

1088

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:1037

efforts that we have any hope of finally banishing the ghosts of
Homer Plessy.

